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Programs that subsidize businesses to stimulate economic development in 
distressed areas outside big cities face formidable odds against their success, according to 
research on the effects of these programs. Evaluations conclude that past efforts to 
provide business financing in distressed areas have not influenced either the level or the 
distribution of economic growth.1 These studies provide virtually no insight into why 
programs have had limited impact. Many evaluations focus on innovative ways of 
comparing what happened with the programs to what would have happened without 
them. While the research contributes to developing better methodology for evaluation, 
these studies off er few ideas on what state and local decision makers can or should do 
differently to make the programs encourage growth in distressed regions, the explicit 
aim of many programs.2 
The conclusions of existing studies--essentially that the programs do not work--
go almost unheeded by state and local policy makers. Since the early 1980s, as state and 
local officials have become major actors in dealing with regional economic problems, 
many of their efforts have involved· financing business un~er a variety of terms to 
stimulate new economic activity. If past efforts to use business financing to stimulate 
economic development at the state level and in distressed areas have not worked, better 
1 For a review of the literature that evaluates these programs, see Margaret E. Dewar, "Tax 
Incentives and Public Loans and Subsidies: What Difference Do They Make in Nonmetropolitan 
Economic Development?" in Financing Economic Deve16pment, eds., Richard D. Bingham, 
Edward W. Hill, and Sammis B. White (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990). 
2 Ibid. 
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understanding is needed to inform new policy making about how new programs might 
work and what would make them. more successful than in the past.3 
This paper looks at an economic development program, Minnesota's Small Cities 
Economic Development Program, to examine and assess the program's results. This 
study offers a more detailed look at a program than other evaluations that typically rely 
on aggregate data about program activity and the regional economy. As a result, this 
examination can better assess why the program succeeded or failed. This paper first 
describes the Small Cities Program, then looks at its results, and finally suggests ways the 
program could better achieve its explicit goals. 
Minnesota's Small Cities Economic Development Program 
The Minnesota Small Cities Economic Development Program provides financing 
for businesses and projects related to businesses, such as infrastructure improvements. A 
local government applies to the state Department of Trade and Economic Development 
(DTED) for a grant on behalf of a specific business. The local jurisdiction usually lends 
the money to the business, although occasionally the business receives a grant. When 
the business repays the loan, the local government deposits some or all of each grant 
plus interest in a revolving loan fund for economic development.4 _ 
3 Harold Wolman, "Local Economic Development Policy: What Explains the Divergence Between Policy 
Analysis and Political Behavior?" Journal of Urban Affairs, vol. 10, no. 1 (1988); National Association of 
State Development Agencies et al., Directory of Incentives for Business Investment and Development in the 
United States: A State-by-State Guide (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 1983 and 1986). 
4 "Minnesota Small Cities Economic Development Program Application Manual," Department of Energy 
and Economic Development (DEED), St. Paul, MN, January 1986. 
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The program has two major sources of funds. One is the state-administered 
allocation of federal Small Cities Development Program grants, a part of the Community 
Development Block Grants program. The other is the state's Economic Recovery 
Grants, a program created in 1984 to supplement federal funds. Any jurisdiction can 
apply for funds under the state program. Indian tribes and the state's largest cities and 
urban counties are not eligible to receive funds from the federal part of the program 
because they may receive Community Development Block Grant funds directly from the 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.5 
From 1984 through late 1988, the Small Cities Economic Development Program 
received annual funding between $8 million and $9 million ( of this, between $5 million 
and $6 million came from the state and approximately $3 million came from the federal 
government). During this period, the program's administrators approved grants to 
162 cities, counties, townships, and Indian reservations, although five of these 
jurisdictions later received no funding when projects fell through. The administrators 
approved a total of 205 grants; eight of these were later terminated with virtually no 
funds spent. Local jurisdictions offered financing to or prepared to undertake projects 
on behalf of 209 businesses; nine of these businesses ultimately received no financing; 
5 Minnesota Statutes, ch. 1161.873, "Economic Recovery Grants;" Minnesota Rules, ch. 4300; "Minnesota 
Small Cities Economic Development Program Application Manual," especially page 1; U.S. Code 42, ch. 69, 
"Community Development;" Code of Federal Regulations 24, ch. 5, subch. C, pt. 570, April 1, 1988. 
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ten businesses received more than one grant or loan. The loans or grants to businesses 
ranged from $10,000 to the legal limit of $500,000.6 
The Small Cities Economic Development Program is an useful vehicle for 
examining state and local efforts to stimulate economic development through business 
subsidies. First, the program is a common type; findings should be helpful in under-
standing many other programs. As of 1986, twenty-six states offered direct loans to 
businesses; fourteen offered grants. Other states have used the federal Small Cities 
Development Program for similar efforts; for instance, Michigan has a nearly identical 
program. The Small Cities Economic Development Program is also similar in design to 
the Urban Development Action Grants Program, which, despite its name, also provided 
federal funding for rural areas.7 
A second reason for examining the Small Cities Economic Development Program 
is that the program is supposed to respond to community distress and help low- and 
moderate-income people, in part because of its connection with the federal Community 
Development Block Grants program. The program is more likely than less targeted 
6 Grants approved for 209 businesses and additional grants approved for ten of the same businesses 
meant DTED approved funds on 219 occasions for a business or a project in support of a business. 
Mike Auger, director, Small Cities Economic Development Program, Community Development Division, 
Department of Trade and Economic Development, St. Paul, MN, personal communication, February 1988; 
data collected from the project files of the Small Cities Economic Development Program, Department of 
Trade and Economic Development, St. Paul, MN; Julia Mason Friedman, Research Paper E, "Improving 
· Capital Market Efficiency Through State Programs," in The Report of the Governor's Commission on the 
Economic Future of Minnesota (St. Paul: Department of Trade and Economic Development, 1987), p. 147. 
7 National Association of State Development Agencies et al., Directory of Incentives; The 
Capital Group, Office of Federal Grant Management, "Final Program Statement: 1988 Michigan Com-
munity Development Block Grant Program," (Lansing: Michigan Department of Commerce, n.d.); 
Edward T. Jennings, Jr., et al., eds., From Nation to States: The Small Cities Community DeveloP: 
ment Block Grant Program (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986); Marie Howland and 
Ted Miller, "Urban Development Action Grants to Rural Communities," Project Report, Urban 
Institute, Washington, DC, May 1988. 
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efforts to deal with two issues of importance to many state and local governments--
regional decline and economic distress in nonmetropolitan areas. 
'-# Third, the Small Cities Economic Development Program has existed longer than 
any other major state economic development program in Minnesota. As in every state, a 
large share of Minnesota's economic development efforts are short-lived. Survival and 
longevity mean data exist, albeit often in the form of voluminous written materials in file 
cabinets rather than computer-ready numbers; the program has results to be evaluated 
and explained. 
Further, because the Small Cities Ec;onomic Development Program has survived 
so long, the program may offer an example of an effort that is more likely to be 
successful than others. The Small Cities Program has matured past start-up problems; 
administrators have had the opportunity to correct difficulties they might have identified 
early in the program's implementation. 
The Results of the Small Cities Economic Development Program 
To assess the results of the Small Cities Economic Development Program, this 
study addressed four major questions. ~irst, what were the program's explicit goals? 
Second, what did the program need to do to achieve these goals? Third, did the 
program take these actions? Finally, given the necessary actions and the program's 
activities, is the program likely to have been successful in achieving its goals? 
The primary objective of the program came from the federal Community 
Development Block Grants legislation--"the development of viable urban communities, 
by ... expanding economic opportunities, principally for persons of low and moderate 
6 
income."8 The state legislation added that the Economic Recovery Grants were "to 
create new employment, maintain existing employment, increase the local tax base, or 
otherwise increase economic activity in a community."9 Every project was to meet at 
least one of three federal objectives to "benefit low- and moderate-income persons," to 
"prevent slums and blight," or to "alleviate urgent community development needs."10 
Every project was to meet two of three state economic development objectives: "creation 
or retention of permanent private sector jobs," "stimulation or leverage of private 
investment," or "increase in local tax base." Program administrators were to consider the 
need for an economic development project "based on deficiencies in employment 
opportunities and circumstances contributing to economic vulnerability." The project was 
to reduce or eliminate this need.11 
In addition to these aims stated in legislation and regulations, the governor and 
the commissioner of D1ED (previously the Department of Energy and Economic 
Development--DEED) touted the program as creating jobs for the state. They made 
frequent announcements, especially in the early years of the program, about the number 
of jobs the program created in the state. When they announced specific projects, they 
8 U.S. Code 42, ch. 69, sec. 5301c; see also, Minnesota Rules, ch. 4300, pt. 0300. 
9 Minnesota Statutes, ch. 1161.873, subd. 2. 
10 Minnesota Rules, ch. 4300, pt. 0300. 
11 Ibid., pt. 1901. 
.. 
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emphasized the number of jobs to be created. Because of this emphasis, the program 
results should be considered with respect to this goal as well.12 
Achieving these goals and objectives involved two not entirely separate kinds of 
outcomes, one leading to economic growth and the other to redistribution of economic 
activity or income within the state or a community. Creating new employment, main-
taining existing employment, increasing the tax base, or stimulating private investment 
either in the state or in a specific community involved stimulating economic growth. 
Encouraging growth in employment, private investment, or tax base within a community 
could be achieved through redistribution without overall economic growth if the program 
helped a jurisdiction attract economic activity that would have occurred elsewhere in the 
state. Assisting distressed communities and low and moderate income people may have 
involved redistribution of growth or income from better off communities and wealthier 
people. The following sections consider what the program needed to do to accomplish 
these objectives and look at what the program actually achieved. 
As this paper will show, the Small Cities Economic Development Program 
succeeded in some respects and failed in others. With reforms, the program could 
become more successful but would continue to confront dilemmas due to inconsistencies 
in goals of state and local officials and the difficulty of making a subsidy to a private 
12 "Dayton Says State's Business Climate Improved in 1983," Minneapolis Star Tribune, 2 March 1984; 
Lynda McDonnell and Steven Thomma, "Economic Development Schooled in Hard Knocks," St. Paul 
Pioneer Press Dispatch, 2 March 1986; Steven Thomma and Lynda McDonnell, "Rosy Figures of Job Agency 
Don't Add Up," St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, 2 March 1986; "Perpich Says His Strategy Created, Saved 
Many Jobs," St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, 17 July 1986; and "Perpich Compiles List of Firms Aided 
During Last Three Years," Minneapolis Star Tribune, 4 October 1986. 
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business produce more benefits than other possible programs for low income people or 
meet community development needs better than other possible approaches. 
Achieving Economic Growth in the State and a Community 
To achieve its goals, the Small Cities Program needed to bring about an increase 
in jobs, tax base, or private investment over growth that would have occurred without the 
program. To do so, the program had to avoid high "opportunity costs" by financing 
projects that would result in more economic activity than would have existed without the 
program. When the state and a town provided financing to a business, the funding 
needed to bring about more growth in the state and in the community than would have 
otherwise occurred. In other w~rds, the program should have allocated economic 
resources in better ways than the private market. 
Also desirable, although not essential to the program's success, was financing 
projects that produced more growth than other possible projects. When a town provided 
financing to a business, the funding could have gone instead to one of numerous other 
businesses. The city administrators needed to choose the project leading to the greatest 
increase in economic growth to make the best use of the public resources. The DTED 
program administrators needed to make grants to communities that would lead to more 
growth than grants to other communities in the state. 
Dealing with market failure - Any economic development program has difficulty 
avoiding high opportunity costs and, therefore, achieving more economic growth than 
would have occurred without the program. One approach is to seek to correct "market 
.. 
. .
.. 
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failures," occasions when private market decision makers act in ways that are 
"inefficient," that neither maximize production with certain levels of inputs nor minimize 
production costs for a level of output.13 
For the Small Cities Economic Development Program to address market failure 
and maximize the opportunity to create economic growth, the program needed to finance 
projects that should have received financing in the private market but were incorrectly 
rejected for loans. For instance, the program needed to finance projects where the costs 
of getting information on the viability of a loan were significant for a private financing 
source or where information was lacking entirely. In addition, the program needed to 
emphasize projects where private lenders discriminated on the basis of characteristics 
unrelated to the viability of loans, and the program needed to fund projects with 
significant positive "extemalities"--benefits borne by groups not involved in a specific 
market transaction. Although occasions when these characteristics exist are difficult to 
identify, the criteria imply that the program should assist small businesses rather than 
large; businesses in distressed areas, especially with undiversified economies, rather than 
in growing areas; businesses owned or managed by minorities and women; businesses 
producing a new type of product or using a new process rather than older processes and 
products; start-up businesses more than established firms; and projects emphasizing 
13 For a more detailed explanation, see Robert H. Haveman, The Economics of the Public Sector 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976), chaps. 2, 3; or other texts on public sector economics. 
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training and education to help workers become more productive not only in a specific 
job in a particular business but also in various jobs in many possible businesses.14 
These indicators of market failure are not the only possible ones. Market failure 
might occur in regions served only by small independent banks unaccustomed to making 
commercial loans or in regions where lending is concentrated in so few institutions that 
lenders can restrict the number of loans and increase interest charges.15 Following 
these guidelines for identifying market failure would not guarantee that the program 
addressed market failure in every case, for private sector lenders do not reject appli-
cations, for instance, from every small business or every female entrepreneur. The 
program would fund some projects that would have been financed without the program. 
Nevertheless, the program would have been more likely to deal with market failure and, 
therefore, to bring about economic growth if program administrators considered how to 
focus the program on the kinds of projects where market failures were most likely. 
What emphasis did the Small Cities Economic Development Program place on 
dealing with market failure? DTED's program application manual asked local juris-
diction applicants to discuss, if applicable, "how the project will support the economic 
viability of small or minority or female-owned businesses or other entities which have 
demonstrated limited access to capital," certainly indicators of market failure. However, 
the program directed little attention to the failure of financial institutions to identify 
14 For a more detailed explanation, see Julia Mason Friedman, "Credit Rationing in Non-metropolitan 
Markets for Small Business Loans," Working Paper 88-02, State and Regional Research Center, University of 
Minnesota, St. Paul, MN, April 1988. 
15 Ibid.; David Leckey, executive director, Southwest Minnesota Initiative Fund, Granite Falls, MN, 
telephone communication, December 1990. 
.. 
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good projects in depressed areas or to businesses' failure to provide low-skilled workers 
with tra~ferrable skills. Communities with higher recent unemployment than the state 
average and with higher poverty rates and lower median incomes than the state as a 
whole in 1979 received higher application ratings than more prosperous communities, but 
most Minnesota communities met this weak definition of need because the prosperous 
and populous Twin Cities metropolitan area and Rochester raised state averages and 
medians. Businesses were to hire and train low and moderate income workers, but the 
training could be limited to that needed for the particular job.16 
The application manual reflected no insight into the importance of addressing 
market failure in its instructions on how applicants should show that the project would 
create and retain jobs, leverage private investment, and increase the local tax base. For 
instance, an applicant stating that a project would increase the tax base needed to 
provide a current tax statement and an estimate of future value after the improvements 
were completed.17 The better, but more difficult, comparison would have been between 
value after improvements and what value would have been if the subsidies had not been 
provided. The property tax values with subsidies would be higher than they would have 
been without subsidies if the Small Cities Program corrected the private market's failure 
to fund viable projects. 
The staff summaries of proposals noted the number of jobs to be created as the 
increase in jobs between the time the grant was received and the end of the project. 
16 "Minnesota Small Cities Economic Development Program Application Manual," especially pages 6, 14, 
and 21-22. 
17 Ibid., especially page 6. 
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Staff summaries calculated the ratio of private investment dollars to the program 
grant.18 The more accurate way to measure job creation or the effect on private 
investment would have been to compare the number of jobs or the amount of private 
investment that existed after the project with the number of jobs or the amount of 
investment that would have existed if the subsidy had not occurred. 
Despite the limited attention to market failure in the application guidelines and 
the staff assessment, the program could have dealt with market failure, if only by 
accident. The program's history suggests a mixed record. Table 1 shows the number and 
percent of firms assisted by the Small Cities Economic Development Program having 
characteristics that might indicate market failure compared to the percent of firms with 
those characteristics in the state or some other. reference region. The program 
performed well in funding start-up businesses, doing so at a rate well above the percent 
of such businesses in the state in a given year. In addition, loans went to businesses in 
counties that the state legislature termed "distressed" at three times the rate that they 
went to businesses in other counties.19 Businesses in economically distressed counties, 
as measured by especially high unemployment, high poverty rates, or low median 
incomes, received a higher share of loans than the counties' share of establishments 
statewide. 
18 "Private investment" did not, in practice, mean that the funds came from a private source. The 
calculation of "private investment" often included large amounts of funding from other public sources. 
19 A "distressed" county met criteria set out in Minnesota Statutes, Sec. 297A.257. Counties designated 
as "economically distressed" in July 1988 either (1) had an unemployment rate over 10 percent for May 1987-
April 1988, or (2) had an unemployment rate 10 percent above the statewide unemployment rate and had 
at least 20 percent of employment in agriculture-related industries (memorandum, Lee W. Munnich to 
Joe Samargia and Tom Gillaspy, and attachments, July 28, 1988). 
. . 
.. 
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Table 1. Establishments Assisted by the Small Cities Economic Development Program with Characteristics 
Indicating Market Failure 
Characteristic 
Small business, 
less than 20 employees 
Start-up business 
Female ownership or management 
Female proprietorship 
or partnership 
Minority ownership or management 
Innovating in product or process 
Located in "distressed" countyi 
Located in 1/5 of counties 
with highest unemployment ratek 
Located in 1/5 of counties with 
highest poverty rate, 19791 
Located in 1/5 of counties with 
lowest median income, 1979 
Number 
Assisted 
84b 
30 
4 
1 
10 
15 
73 
74 
42 
41 
Percent 
of Assisted 
Firms• 
42.2 (199) 
14.7 (204) 
1.9 (209) 
3.4 (29t 
4.8 (207) 
7.4 (205) 
33.3 (219) 
33.8 {219) 
19.2 (219) 
18.7 (219) 
Percent of 
Establishments 
in Comparison 
Region 
78-8"'f 
4.2-9.8'1 
NA" 
31.51 
3.2h 
NA 
10.Si 
10.2 
5.5 
5.1 
• Data on assisted firms collected from the files of the Small Cities Economic Development Program, Department of Trade and 
Economic Development, St. Paul, MN. Number of assisted establishments for which information was obtained is in parentheses. 
b Includes new businesses. 
c Ernesto C. Venegas, "Understanding Job Growth in Minnesota," Research Paper C, in The Report or the Governor's Commission 
on the Economic Future or Minnesota (St. Paul: Department of Trade and Economic Development, 1987), p. 97. Number refers to 
small establishments in Minnesota. 
d Paul Reynolds and Brenda Miller, 1987 Minnesota New Firms Study; An Exploration or New Firms and Their Economic 
Contributions, CURA Report 88-1 (Minneapolis: Center for Urban and Regional Affairs, 1988), pp. 15-16, appendix B. Number 
refers to start-up businesses in Minnesota. 
" NA means no comparable number available. In this case, recent data arc available on female ownership and management for 
proprietorships and partnerships, not corporations. 
r Includes only businesses that DTED staff classified as proprietorships or partnerships. 
I U.S. Small Business Administration, The State or Small Business: A Report or the President Transmitted to the Congress 1989 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1989), Table A26. Number is the percent of nonfarm sole proprietorships owned 
by women in Small Business Administration Region V (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin) in 1986. 
h Markham and Associates, "Minority Business Ownership in the Northwest United States,• Regional Issues Forum, University or 
Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, April 1989, Table 3. 
Memorandum, Lee Munnich to Joe Samargia and Tom Gillaspy, and attachments, July 28, 1988. See definition of a distressed 
county in notes to text. 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns, 1986: Minnesota (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 
Table le. Number refers to business establishments in 1986 in Minnesota. This is also the source for the percent of Minnesota 
establishments in counties with other measures of distress. 
k "State and Arca Labor Force Estimates, Januaiy 1980-December 1987," Research and Statistics Office, Minnesota Department of 
Jobs and Training, St. Paul, MN, August 1988 (revised September 1988). Unemployment rate is for the year preceding the 
application, weighted by grant size when there was more than one grant per county. 
1 Poverty rates and median incomes for counties are from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population 1980, "General Social 
and Economic Characteristics," vol. 25, "Minnesota," Tables 71 and 72. 
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The program financed minority-owned or managed businesses at a rate slightly 
above that of the percent of minority-run businesses in the state. Minority business 
ownership in the state fell below the level expected given the minority population of 
4 percent in 1980, but the program succeeded in funding businesses at a level 
comparable to the percent of minorities in the population. 
In contrast, the program did poorly in financing small businesses and female-
owned or managed businesses. The program funded 84 businesses (including start-ups) 
with fewer than twenty employees, slightly more than 40 percent of the firms assisted. 
Because small firms make up approximately 80 percent of businesses in the state, the 
program funded larger businesses in disproportionate numbers and may have shifted 
financial resources away from ·small firms to larger ones. Less than 4 percent of the 
proprietorships and partnerships that received financing were owned by women, but 
women owned nearly ten times this percent of proprietorships and partnerships in the 
region that included Minnesota. Women owned or managed less than 2 percent of all 
businesses that received program financing. One explanation of why women were 
virtually left out of the program is that female ownership and management are 
concentrated in finance, insurance, real estate, wholesaling, retailing, and services--
industries that make up only 20 percent of the businesses that received financing from 
the Small Cities Economic Development Program (see appendix table A-1). Never-
theless, if the program had funded businesses owned or managed by women in the 
proportion that women proprietors exist in the industries favored by the program, eight 
15 
or nine times more female-owned or managed businesses would have received 
funding.20 
In sum, the Small Cities Program did well in some areas and poorly in others. 
The program may have stimulated economic growth by dealing with situations wher:e 
private financing sources were most likely to overlook good investments. However, the 
program had less effect than might have been possible had more efforts been directed 
toward dealing with market failure. 
Moving businesses into the state or keeping businesses from leaving - Economic 
growth within a state can result when growth is transferred to the state by moving 
businesses in or retaining businesses that would have operated elsewhere without the 
program.21 The DTED program application instructions stated that applicants could 
argue that a project would provide necessary "incentive financing"--"a favorable 
interest rate and term ... to induce an owner to expand or build a new facility in a 
community."22 The manual made no other note of using the program to attract or 
retain businesses that would have operated outside the state. 
20 U.S. Small Business Administration, The State of Small Business: A Report of the President Trans-
mitted to the Congress 1989 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1989), Tables A.26, A.27; files of 
the Small Cities Economic Development Program. 
21 Although success in attracting a business to the state or retaining one that would have operated 
outside the state does lead to economic growth, using subsidies for this purpose is problematic. If the 
subsidies are successful, states spend money to move businesses around the country with no benefits for the 
nation as a whole. Further, much of the money may be wasted as states finance businesses for doing what 
they would have done anyway. The approach encourages businesses to play states against each other to 
increase the package of benefits in the location they will choose anyway. 
22 "Minnesota Small Cities Economic Development Program Application Manual," pages 7 and 23. 
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On the other hand, the governor and the commissioner of DEED (predecessor to 
DTED) emphasized the importance of subsidies in attracting businesses from other 
states and keeping businesses from moving away. The governor cited Minnesota 
economic development programs' (including the Small Cities Program's) "hundreds of 
successes," noting companies that had moved to the state with assistance. The 
commissioner of DEED stated that Minnesota had to give assistance to retain firms 
wooed by other states. 'That's just the reality of life in the economic development 
warfare among the states," he said.23 
What is the Small Cities Economic Development Program's track record in 
business retention and recruitment? The program rarely caused businesses to locate or 
remain in Minnesota that would not have done so anyway. Table 2 shows the results of 
interviews with those who made location and expansion decisions connected with 
receiving funds from the state. About three-quarters of decision makers considered no 
location outside the state. The applications filed by local jurisdictions suggested the 
same, although DTED staff noted that close to one-third of the cases involved "incentive 
financing," with 17 percent of the subsidies justified by no financial need other than the 
desire to influence a location decision. Among businesses that considered locations 
outside the state, almost three in ten decision makers volunteered that the availability of 
Small Cities Economic Development Program funds were a factor in their location. In 
23 Rudy Perpich, governor of Minnesota, letter to the editor, St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, 27 August 
1987; McDonnell and Thomma, "Economic Development Schooled in Hard Knocks." For other examples, 
see Mark B. Dayton, commissioner of Minnesota Department of Energy and Economic Development, "State 
Must Develop New Strategies to Aid Areas in Distress," Minneapolis Star and Tribune, 7 January 1985; 
"Dayton: State Must Compete for New Businesses," Bemidji Pioneer, 26 September 1985. 
.. 
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Table 2. Relationship of Small Cities Economic Development Program to Business Decisions to Locate 
or Remain in the State 
Evidence 
From interviews with decision makers•: 
Considered other locations 
- in state(s) bordering Minnesota 
- in state( s) not bordering Minnesota 
- in state(s) bordering and not bordering Minnesota 
- in no other states 
Total 
Of those considering a site outside the state, 
- volunteered that program funds 
important in location decision 
- did not volunteer that program 
funds were important 
Total 
Stated that without program funds, 
- definitely would have done project 
- probably would have 
- not sure 
- probably would not have 
- definitely would not have 
Total 
From applicationsb: 
Considered other locations 
- in state(s) bordering Minnesota 
- in state(s) not bordering Minnesota 
- in state(s) bordering and not bordering Minnesota 
- in another country 
- in other state(s) and another country 
- in no other states 
Total 
Cited "incentive financing" as important 
- with other financial reasons 
- with no other financial reasons 
- did not cite "incentive financing" as important 
Total 
Number 
18 
5 
12 
108 
143 
10 
25 
35 
8 
1 
6 
8 
12 
35 
28 
8 
6 
2 
1 
149 
194 
19 
22 
90 
131 
Percent of 
Decisions 
12.6 
35 
8.4 
755 
100.0 
28.6 
71.4 
100.0 
22.8 
2.8 
17.1 
22.8 
343 
100.0 
14.4 
4.1 
3.1 
1.0 
5 
76.8 
100.0 
145 
16.8 
68.7 
100.0 
• Source is interviews with business decision makers involved in getting Small Cities Economic Development Program funds for their 
businesses and knowledgeable about location and expansion decisions associated with the funding. Seventy-six other business decision 
makers were not interviewed because they could not be located, they refused to be interviewed, they could not be reached after 
repeated tries, or so little information had been obtained about the project that the interviews would not have been useful. 
b Source is information in the files of the Small Cities Economic Development Program. Totals are less than the total number of 
business subsidies approved, 219, because files could not be examined in enough detail to address this issue or because no staff 
summary of the reasons for the need for financing could be located in the files. 
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addition, nearly 60 percent of those who considered sites outside the state said they 
would not have gone ahead with the project without the funds.24 So few businesses 
considered locations out of the state, however, that only between 7 and 14 percent of the 
projects DTED approved might have influenced a decision to locate or remain in the 
state (relying on the number who volunteered that the funds affected their location or 
on the number who said they would not have gone ahead with the project without 
the funds). 
Achieving Growth in a Community Although Not in the State 
To stimulate economic growth in a community, but not necessarily in the state, the 
program needed to cause activity that would not otherwise have occurred in that 
particular place.25 If a business could have found other financing to expand or locate in 
that place without the program, then the Small Cities Program probably had no effect on 
the community, for the private funds that the program freed for other uses would 
probably not also go into the community.26 For the Small Cities Economic Develop-
ment Program to increase economic activity in the communities it funded, administrators 
24 The interview data overstate the importance of the Small Cities Economic Development Program 
because those interviewed knew that the study concerned the program so they were attuned to think about it 
and to mention it. 
25 Although the activity might not have taken place in the particular community, DTED's funding of an 
alternative project could have caused economic growth elsewhere in the state instead. DTED's decisions 
would have shifted growth around the state, but brought about no additional statewide growth. Therefore, 
even if a community grew, the state did not necessarily grow also. 
26 A banker in a larger town forty miles away, for instance, would have no reason to assure that the 
funds he or she would have loaned to the subsidized business went to some other business in the same 
community. For another example, an individual who would have made a loan to a relative who owned a 
business that received a subsidy would probably not be inclined to put the same funds into some other 
business in the community. 
.. 
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needed to assure that a firm had to have the program money to undertake the project 
and that the project was credit-worthy. Alternatively, the funding needed to cause a 
.. business to locate or remain in the community when it would not otherwise have 
done so.27 
Filling unmet financing needs of credit-worthy businesses - According to the 
director, the Small Cities Economic Development Program was to provide "last resort 
financing." The application instructions emphasized the importance of showing a 
"financing gap." Applicants were required to document that "all other sources [of 
financing] have been considered and are not available or are not appropriate." The 
applicant needed to show that the firm's owners did not have enough equity to invest, 
the owners could not get enough private financing, the owners could not pay market 
interest rates or the market terms were unfavorable, the business could not qualify for 
enough other state and federal financing, "incentive financing" was needed, and/ or the 
cost of public improvements for the project was too high for the owners or the 
jurisdictions.28 
Difficulties in finding other financing could also indicate financial trouble and an 
inviable project. While the application required business financial statements from the 
previous three years, a current debt schedule, financial projections for the next three 
n After jurisdictions received financing for a business and the business repaid the loan, local officials 
could make new loans to businesses from the revolving loan fund. This evaluation considers only the 
economic development effects of the initial state agency decision to make a grant to a jurisdiction on behalf 
of a business, not the effects of recycling the money through the revolving loan fund. 
28 Auger, personal communication, February 1988; "Minnesota Small Cities Economic Development 
Program Application Manual," pages 14 and 23, attachment III of application in appendix III. 
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years, and a marketing plan, the assessment of an application included no critique of 
financial viability. In the only assessment of "financial feasibility," an application 
received additional points for more private funds invested, for more of all other kinds 
of funds invested, and for a higher interest rate on the loan from the program 
grant funds.29 
At least until mid-1987, state economic development staff did not do the cash flow 
analysis needed to assess whether a business could undertake the project without the 
funds or whether a project was viable. Materials in the project files made the process of 
determining a financing gap seem haphazard. Documentation of financial need 
appeared in the files for some projects, but not for many others. In two-thirds of the 
application files examined, business owners and local officials asserted that a financing 
gap existed but did not provide any proof (see Table 3). More than one-fourth of the 
application files did not include an administrative summary of financing gap needs. 
Another researcher who studied the Small Cities Program files concluded that DTED 
staff looked at whether projects met two of the three state objectives and one of three 
federal objectives but did not do more thorough analysis to determine if private financing 
were available. The DTED staff left responsibility to the local jurisdiction for evaluating 
both the business need and the financial viability of the proposed project.30 
29 "Minnesota Small Cities Economic Development Program Application Manual," pages 14 and 24; 
Friedman, "Improving Capital Market Efficiency Through State Programs." · 
30 Friedman, "Improving Capital Market Efficiency through State Programs." 
·-
.. 
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Table 3. Evidence of a Financing Gap in Businesses Receiving Funds 
Evidence 
From interviews with decision makers2 : 
In trying to get financing the business, 
- looked at some other sources 
- looked at all other sources 
- looked at no other sources 
Total 
Stated that without program funds, 
- definitely would have done project 
- probably would have 
- not sure 
- probably would not have 
- definitely would not have 
Total 
Of those who probably or definitely would not have done project, 
- looked at some other sources of financing 
- looked at all other sources 
- looked at no other sources 
Total 
From application files: 
At least one document to demonstrate a financing gap was present 
No document to demonstrate a gap was present 
Total 
Administrative summary sheet on financing gap was present 
Administrative summary sheet was not present 
Total 
• See notes to Table 2. 
Number (percent) 
111 ( 79.9) 
9 ( 6.5) 
19 ( 13.7) 
139 (100.0) 
23 ( 16.7) 
10 ( 7.2) 
24 ( 17.4) 
32 ( 23.2) 
49 ( 35.5) 
138 (100.0) 
65 ( 80.2) 
9 ( 11.1) 
7 ( 8.6) 
81 (100.0) 
53 ( 34.6) 
100 ( 65.4) 
153 (100.0) 
130 ( 73.0) 
48 ( 27.0) 
178 (100.0) 
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Local staff sometimes did financial analysis of projects, but more often did not. 
For instance, in the· Fergus Falls Port Authority four staff worked on economic devel-
opment. According to one, everyone had work experience as business consultants or 
loan officers, and they looked at the same information a bank would to determine 
whether a business was viable. On the other hand, local officials appeared to rely on 
minimal financial analysis or rejected signs of problems in Ely, where a project to 
develop a lodge and convention center languished for years and where another project, 
approved in 1988, was in financial trouble by fall 1989.31 
The prospect of getting the initial funding for a revolving loan fund was important 
in many local efforts to obtain grants through the Small Cities Economic Development 
Program. The president of one company said that he initially turned down an invitation 
to apply for financing but changed his mind because "it would really help our town." 
When Cosmos Enterprises in Elbow Lake received a second Small Cities loan in 1988, 
many focused not only on benefits from Cosmos' expansion but also on the advantages of 
the addition to the revolving loan fund. As the economic development director stated, 
"We fortunately have a company like Cosmos in town which can put together strong 
development projects to attract [grant] monies." The community development director of 
the metropolitan suburb Cottage Grove called the Small Cities grant a "win-win" 
situation. The city got a "nest egg" for a loan fund, and the business received a low-
31 Toni O'Brien, staff, Fergus Falls Port Authority, Fergus Falls, Minnesota, personal communication, 
August 1988; files of the Small Cities Economic Development Program; Jeffrey C. Kummer, "Troubled 
Project in Ely Foundered on 'Good Faith,'" St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, 10 September 1989. 
.. 
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interest loan.32 The desire to fund a local revolving loan fund for economic 
development could have encouraged local officials to look for businesses with good 
•· credit, who could get financing elsewhere, but who would also certainly repay the funds 
to the local loan pool. On the other hand, a jurisdiction could back a business that was 
not credit-worthy out of "ignorance, excess enthusiasm, or just plain wishful thinking," 
one researcher concluded.33 Neither of these possible directions would help the Small 
Cities Economic Development Program encourage economic growth. 
In mid-1987, the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development issued 
more specific guidelines for determining the presence of a financing gap. The guidelines 
asked for more analysis of a business's financial position. The new procedures meant 
DTED staff needed to determine whether a business could proceed without the funding 
and what the amount and terms of the subsidy should be.34 The procedures could also 
have helped in determining whether a project was financially viable. 
In mid-1988, despite the new review procedures, the program funded the project 
of "a financially strapped businessman, a convicted drug dealer and a mysterious Texas 
mortgage banker," in the words of a St. Paul newspaper reporter. No one had done 
32 Norman Fey, president, Fey Industries, Edgerton, Minnesota, telephone interview, winter 1989; 
"City Receives $100,000 Grant/Loan," Grant County Herald, 10 February 1988; "Editorial: Cosmos 
Connection Works Again," Grant County Herald, 10 February 1988; "Cottage Grove Landed Firm with a 
Deal," St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, 1 January 1986. 
33 Friedman, "Improving Capital Market Efficiency Through State Programs," page 149. 
34 Cheryl Johnson, Dick Nadeau, and Carol Pressley-Olson, staff for the Small Cities Economic 
Development Program, DTED, St. Paul, Minnesota, personal communication, December 1988; memo-
randum, Jack R. Stokvis, general deputy assistant secretary for Community Planning and Development, 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, to all regional administrators and all category A field 
office managers, May 19 and June 2, 1987. 
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routine financial checks. As of fall 1989, the project was in financial difficulty, and its 
future was uncertain. Robert Benner, Deputy Commissioner for Community Develop-
ment, stated, "We always assume the people we are dealing with are operating in good 
faith."35 
The statements of business managers who made project decisions substantiates the 
evidence that little assurance existed of financing gaps, although many decision makers 
stated they would not have undertaken the project without the assistance. Only about 
7 percent of decision makers stated that they had exhausted every other financing option. 
Nearly 14 percent stated they had not looked for financing anywhere else (see Table 3). 
Although almost 60 percent of decision makers said they probably or certainly would not 
have undertaken the project without the Small Cities funds,36 only 11 percent of these 
. 
said they had looked into every other financing possibility, and more than 8 percent 
stated they had explored no other financing possibilities. 
To stimulate economic activity in a community, the program needed to assure not 
only that the projects it funded could not have received private financing but also that 
they were viable. By mid-1989 about 15 percent of the businesses that had received 
funding from 1984 through late 1988 were not operating. A few of these had never 
opened; a few others hoped to reopen if their financial difficulties could be resolved.37 
35 Jeffrey C. Kummer, "Troubled Project in Ely Foundered on 'Good Faith,'" and related articles, 
St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, 10 September 1989; id., "Trade Chief Pledges Closer Scrutiny after 
Ely Project," St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, 12 September 1989. 
36 These data overstate the importance of the program because decision makers made their statements 
in response to a direct question about the effects of the program. 
~ Interviews with business decision makers; files of the Small Cities Economic Development Program. 
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During the same period, many businesses, roughly one-half of 1 percent of all 
establishments in the state, discontinued operations each year in Minnesota.38 A higher 
.· failure rate would be expected for a program seeking to fund businesses that could not 
get financing elsewhere, but more careful assessment of business plans and financial 
statements probably could have reduced the program's rate of business failures.39 
The Small Cities Economic Development Program did affect the growth of some 
communities by providing funds for some deserving projects that could not get financing 
elsewhere. However, careful assessment of businesses rarely occurred, and local officials 
had numerous reasons to fund either very safe projects that could have obtained 
financing elsewhere or very risky projects. As a result, the program had less effect on 
community growth than it could have. 
Affecting location decisions within the state - Just as the state could grow as a 
result of retaining or attracting businesses that would have operated in other states, 
community economic growth could occur if a jurisdiction used the program to recruit 
businesses that would have operated in other communities in the state. DTED program 
staff said they did not intend for the program to work this• way. According to the 
supervisor of the Small Cities Economic Development Program, the program would not 
assist the "pirating" of a business from another city in the state. It also would not fund a 
38 Calculation is based on the average annual number of business failures from 1984 through 1988 in 
Minnesota divided by the number of business establishments in Minnesota in 1986 [Dun and Bradstreet data 
in Minnesota Economic Resource Group, 1990 Economic Report to the Governor (St. Paul: Minnesota 
Economic Resource Group, 1990), Table 24; U.S. Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns, 1986: 
Minnesota (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), Table le]. 
39 See also, Friedman, "Improving Capital Market Efficiency Through State Programs." 
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project when that business would compete with other businesses' operations in the state. 
For instance, the staff rejected an application for funding for a meatpacking and 
deboning plant, part of an industry facing stagnant demand, because the loan could have 
displaced jobs in another plant.40 
Local officials making applications to the Small Cities Program differed from 
DTED staff over the importance of attracting businesses from other parts of the state. 
As one local official stated, her agency did not compete with other nearby towns and 
would not work with a company coming from another town within a sixty mile radius--
unless the business's city could not or woul_d not give assistance.41 Even if all busi-
nesses within sixty miles were excluded, most of Minnesota lay outside that range. 
What did the DTED staff do to prevent pirating? They asked for assurances that 
businesses were not using subsidies to move from one location to another within the 
state. Ninety-five percent of the applications indicated no other location within the state 
was under consideration.42 In the case of an application for a "footloose" business that 
provided mailing services related to coupons, premiums, and contests, DTED asked for 
evidence that jobs "created" in one location would not be lost in one or two nearby sites. 
The staff also sought assurances that assistance for a retail or service business would not 
hurt other local businesses. For instance, when DTED questioned an application for 
40 Auger, personal communication, February 1988. 
41 Local official who has applied for several projects through the Small Cities Economic Development 
Program, personal communication, August 1988. 
42 This was probably an overstatement because of DTED's position of not funding projects that would 
move business from one town to another within the state. 
·. 
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assistance for an auto and equipment repair business, the mayor argued that testimony at 
the public hearing showed a healthier repair shop would generate business for other 
• · local firms, and the regional development planner said considerable local unmet demand 
existed.43 
In some cases, the staff asked another division of DTED to do "displacement 
analyses," assessments of the prospects for an industrial sector and the capacity of 
existing firms in the state to handle future demand. Many of these studies showed that 
subsidies for a firm would not take business away from other companies, but in the 
meatpacking example cited by the program's director, the analysis showed that excess 
capacity existed in the state and the subsidy was not approved. In other instances, 
however, the staff did approve subsidies in industry sectors where analysis had shown 
that displacement would occur.44 
Local officials nevertheless used the program to try to attract businesses from 
other jurisdictions. In a highly publicized case the city of Blaine used a $250,000 grant 
from the Small Cities Economic Development Program along with tax-increment 
financing and creation of an industrial park to persuade NCR-Comten to build a 
computer assembly plant in Blaine rather than in one of the other northern Twin Cities 
suburbs competing for the plant. Although the application stated that NCR-Comten 
might site the plant in South Carolina or in another country, the company officer who 
dealt with the city and the state later said that because of the desire to be close to the 
43 Files of the Small Cities Economic Development Program. 
44 Office memoranda on displacement analysis, Policy Analysis Division, Department of Trade and 
Economic Development, 1985-88. 
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corporate headquarters, also in the northern suburbs, "we never looked outside the state. 
We would never want to move our headquarters." NCR-Comten ultimately did not use 
the Small Cities money because the grant required hiring a certain number of workers, a 
share of them low and moderate income people.45 In another case, a city's economic 
development planner said that he saw in a newspaper article that a community was 
working with a company to resolve problems with a potential expansion site. "We had a 
site; we had a building about the right size," he said. "On a whim, I contacted them 
(the company) .... We stole them from another community.'146 
Despite local officials' recruitment efforts, a small proportion of grants contributed 
to the growth of a few communities by helping businesses locate in one community 
rather than another. As Table 4 shows, 80 percent of business decision makers stated 
they considered no location within the state 9ther than in the community where they 
located. Of those who did consider other sites in the state, 17 percent volunteered that 
the funding from the Small Cities Economic Development Program was important in 
their decision to choose or to remain at that site. Slightly more than 60 percent said 
they would not have undertaken the activity without the public funds. However, so few 
considered alternative sites in the state that the program affected the choice only in 3 to 
12 percent of cases (relying on the number of those interviewed who volunteered that 
45 "Suburbs All Roli Out Their Red Carpets for Business," Minneapolis Star and Tribune, 30 January 
1986; Ron Henrickson, director of economic development, Blaine, MN, telephone communication, December 
1988; "Tale of Two Cities, One Choice Plant," St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, 13 November 1985; "Blaine-
NCR Deal in Jeopardy," St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, 5 March 1986; Deets Mittelstadt, NCR-Comten, 
telephone communication, spring 1989. 
46 Economic development planner, telephone communication, December 1988. 
.. 
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Table 4. Relationship of Small Cities Economic Development Program to Business 
Decisions to Locate in a Community 
Evidence 
From interviews with decision makers8 : 
Considered other locations 
- in the Twin Cities metro area 
- outside the Twin Cities metro area 
- both inside and outside the Twin Cities area 
- in no other areas of the state 
Total 
Of those who considered another site in the state, 
- volunteered that program funds important 
in location decision 
- did not volunteer that program funds 
were important 
Total 
Stated that without program funds, 
- definitely would have done project 
- probably would have 
- not sure 
- probably would not have 
- definitely would not have 
Total 
From applications: 
Considered other locations 
- in the Twin Cities metro area 
- outside the Twin Cities area 
- both inside and outside the 
Twin Cities area 
- in no other areas of the state 
Total 
a See notes to Table 2. 
Number 
3 
17 
9 
114 
143 
5 
24 
29 
4 
1 
6 
9 
9 
29 
3 
7 
0 
182 
192 
Percent of 
Decisions 
2.1 
11.9 
6.3 
79.7 
100.0 
17.2 
82.8 
100.0 
13.8 
3.4 
20.7 
31.0 
31.0 
100.0 
1.6 
3.6 
0.0 
94.8 
100.0 
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the public funds were important or on the number who stated the program affected their 
decision in response to a direct question). 
Redistributing Economic Activity 
Economic growth can accompany redistribution to less well off places and people, 
but economic activity can also be redistributed without growth when funds go 
disproportionately to distressed places and poorer people. To reallocate economic 
activity to needy communities, more of the funds of the Small Cities Economic 
Development Program should have gone to distressed areas than to prosperous areas. 
Helping distressed areas - The staff of DTED made efforts to distribute the funds 
to distressed areas by awarding up to 160 of a total possible 600 application points based 
on certain need-based criteria. Applicants provided information on local unemployment 
rates, 1979 poverty rates, and 1979 median incomes. If these numbers were greater than 
the statewide unemployment rate or the 1979 poverty rate, or lower than the 1979 
median income, the application received points in the rating system. All applications 
discussed the community and economic need in detail and described how the project 
would address this need. DTED staff rated the extent of the community's need based on 
this narrative.47 These criteria for demonstrating community need were weak. Most of 
Minnesota's jurisdictions had unemployment higher than the statewide rate, poverty rates 
higher than the state poverty rates, and median incomes lower than the state median 
income because the most populous jurisdictions of the state, the Twin Cities 
47 "Minnesota Small Cities Economic Development Program Application Manual," pages 21 and 22. 
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metropolitan area, were the most prosperous. Exactly what constituted "need" was not 
defined, although DTED offered a list of issues to address in the narrative--"economic 
vulnerability of the community, events contributing to the depressed economy, 
unemployment. .. , need to attract or retain essential services, events contributing to a 
unique situation, number of businesses lost and started in the past three years, 
infrastructure condition ... , outmigration due to lack of jobs, opportunity or timeliness to 
implement project, labor pool needs.''48 The result was that prosperous communities 
could receive high ratings for need. For instance, an application from Bloomington, one 
of the twenty fastest growing cities in the Twin Cities metropolitan area between· 1985 
and 1987, received the second highest possible rating for community need. An 
application from Cottage Grove, in the county with the second highest median income in 
the state in 1979, emphasized that a vacant industrial building deterred other businesses 
from locating in the city's industrial park and a plant closing had cost the city 400 jobs. 
An application from Rochester, in another county with high 1979 median income, argued 
that the city was excessively dependent on a few industries, especially health care, and 
needed the state funding to help reduce its economic vulnerability. An application from 
Brooklyn Park, where employment grew 25 percent between 1985 and 1987, pointed out 
that the loss of a business would cost 350 jobs but that the community had been 
"fortunate" in not losing businesses.49 Even when a community did not receive points 
48 Ibid., page 21. 
49 Files of the Small Cities Economic Development Program; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of 
Population 1980, "General Social and Economic Characteristics," vol. 25, "Minnesota," Table 180; 
Regan Carlson, "Employment Trends in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area, 1980-1987," Publication 
No. 620-89-044, Metropolitan Council, St. Paul, Minnesota, March 1989, Table 10. 
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for economic distress, the application could receive enough points from other parts of 
the application that the proposed project could be approved for funding. 
Where did the funds go? As Table 5 shows, the distribution of funds did correlate 
weakly with regional economic distress. Counties with higher unemployment either for 
the quarter or the year preceding the application received more funds per capita than 
counties with lower unemployment. Although correlations of per capita funding with 
poverty rates and median incomes were weak, they were in the desired direction for 
dealing with distress. The correlations were sensitive to the results in a few counties; 
when the three counties with the highest unemployment and the county with the highest 
per capita funding were excluded, no relationship existed between distress measures and 
per capita funding. 
The distribution of funds per capita for groups of counties arranged by their level 
of distress helps explain why the correlation between distress measures and funding is 
weak. If the program distributed funds disproportionately to more distressed areas, 
per capita funding for the least distressed counties would be very low or zero, and the 
level of funding would increase steadily or at a more rapid rate as distress became 
greater. 
None of the relationships between distress measures and per capita funding show 
· this kind of pattern. The 20 percent of counties with the lowest unemployment for the 
year preceding the application received less funds per capita than did the 20 percent of 
counties with the highest unemployment for the preceding year (see Figure 1). However, 
for the 60 percent of counties in the middle of the distribution, funding per capita was 
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Table 5. Correlations Between Per Capita Funds Received in a County and Measures of 
Economic Distress 
Distress Measure 
County poverty rate, 1979b 
County median income, 1979 
County weighted unemployment rate 
for year preceding applicationc 
County weighted unemployment rate 
for quarter preceding application 
* * = .001 level of significance 
* = .01 level of significance 
Initial Funds 
Per Capita3 
.15 
-.21 
.37** 
.29* 
Revised 
Per Capita 
.18 
-.22 
.40** 
.37** 
• Source is files of the Small Cities Economic Development Program. Revised grants differed from initial 
grants when a project was cancelled with little money spent or when a jurisdiction received more funds for 
an ongoing project in an amendment to the first grant. Population data for counties were obtained from 
the Minnesota Office of the State Demographer, St. Paul, MN. · 
b Poverty rates and median incomes come from U.S. Bureau of the Census. Census of Population 1980, 
"General Social and Economic Characteristics," vol. 25, "Minnesota," Tables 71 and 72. 
c Unemployment rates come from "State and Area Labor Force Estimates, January 1980-December 1987," 
Research and Statistics Office, Minnesota Department of Jobs and Training, St. Paul, MN, August 1988 
(revised September 1988); "1988 County Labor Force Estimates (released February 21, 1989)," Research 
and Statistics Office, Minnesota Department of Jobs and Training, St. Paul, MN, February 1989. 
Unemployment rates are weighted by the size of the grant where jurisdictions in a county received more 
than one grant. 
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not related to distress, although all received more than the counties with the lowest 
unemployment and less than the counties with the highest unemployment. 
The 20 percent of counties with the lowest unemployment for the quarter 
preceding the application received less funding per capita than the 20 percent of counties 
with the highest unemployment for the preceding quarter (see Figure 2). But the 
60 percent of counties in the middle of the distribution received erratic amounts of 
funding. 
The relationships between per capita funding and poverty rates and between per 
capita funding and median incomes were even less consistent with the pattern that would 
show funds were going to distressed areas of the state. The highest per capita funding 
went to a group of counties with low, though not the lowest, median incomes in 1979, 
and the 10 percent of counties with the highest median incomes received the lowest 
funding per capita (see Figure 3). However, the 10 percent of counties with the second 
highest median incomes received more funding per capita than any other group of 
counties except the 10 percent with the second lowest median incomes. The figure 
shows little relationship between median incomes and per capita funding. 
The 20 percent of counties with the highest poverty rates in 1979 received more 
funding per capita than the 20 percent of counties with the lowest poverty rates 
(see Figure 4). However, for the 60 percent of counties in the middle of the distribution, 
little or no relationship existed between per capita funding and poverty rates. 
Figure 1 
Revised Grant $ Per Capita for County Deciles 
10% of Counties with Lowest Annual Unemployment 
to 10% of Counties with Highest Annual Unemployment 
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Figure 2 
Revised Grant $ Per Capita for County Deciles 
10% of Counties with Lowest Quarterly Unemployment 
to 10% with Highest Quarterly Unemployment 
County Deciles, Quarterly Unemployment Rates 
Unemployment rate for quarter prior to application 
v.> 
O'\ 
Figure 3 
Revised Grant $ Per Capita for County Deciles 
10% of Counties with Highest Median Income 
to 10% with Lowest Median Income 
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Figure 4 
Revised Grant $ Per Capita for County Deciles 
10% of Counties with Lowest Poverty 
to 10% of Counties with Highest Poverty 
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Economically distressed counties received smaller grants than the more 
prosperous counties received. As Table 6 shows, wherever correlations existed between 
grant size and measures of distress, larger grants were going to better off counties. 
Counties with higher incomes in 1979 received larger grants. Similarly, counties with 
lower poverty rates in 1979 initially received larger grants. 
Overall, the Small Cities Economic Development Program successfully sent higher 
levels of funding, measured on a per capita basis, to some distressed counties. Never-
theless, the program could have done much better. For example, the 30 percent of 
counties with the lowest poverty rates received 42 percent of total program funds; the 
50 percent of counties with the lowest poverty rates received nearly 60 percent of the 
total program funds. A major portion of these funds could have been allocated to more 
distressed regions. 
Benefiting low and moderate income people - Even if the program had a mixed 
record of directing aid toward distressed counties, the program could have helped low 
and moderate income people whether they lived in distressed counties or in more 
prosperous counties.50 All projects had to meet at least ohe of the three federal 
objectives to qualify for funding; almost all applicants chose to benefit low and moderate 
income people. DTED outlined standards for demonstrating that this objective would be 
met. Applicants had to show that at least 51 percent of the jobs were for low- and 
moderate-income people; they had to demonstrate that the retained jobs employed 
50 
"Low- and moderate-income" is household income below the Section 8 income limits defined by the 
federal Department of Housing and Urban Development for counties or metropolitan areas. 
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Table 6. Correlations of Size of Initial Grants and Revised Grants with Measures of 
Economic Distress 
Distress Measure 
Used by DTED staff: 
County poverty rate, 1979 
County median income, 1979 
County unemployment rate, 
quarter preceding application 
County unemployment rate, 
year preceding application 
Not used by DTED staff: 
County per capita personal income, 
preceding year or 1986b 
County average earnings per job, 
preceding year or 1986 
County percent population 
outmigration, 1984-85c 
Number of grants is 203 
•• = .001 level of significance, 1-tailed 
• = .01 level of significance, 1-tailed 
• See notes to Table 5. 
Initial Grants2 Revised Grants 
-.18* 
-.14 
.23** 
.19* 
.01 
.06 
.06 
.09 
-.02 
-.03 
.15 
.14 
.09 
.13 
b Per capita personal income and average earnings per job are from Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Regional Economic Profile data for Minnesota, April 1986. 
c Migration data are from U.S. Internal Revenue Service, county to county migration flows from 
administrative records, 1983-84, and 1984-85. 
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low- and moderate-income people and that new jobs would be filled by or made 
available to low- and moderate-income people. The applicant provided a list of jobs or 
job categories, stated how many of these would be for low- and moderate-income people, 
and explained how thejobs would be made available to low- and moderate-income 
people. According to the application manual, DTED staff first screened applications to 
assure they met a federal objective. If they did not, the application would not be 
reviewed further.51 
. After a project received funding, the local jurisdiction had to show that the jobs 
had been made available to low- and moderate-income people or that the new 
employees were members of low- and moderate-income households when they were 
hired. The jurisdiction submitted quarterly reports listing the jobs created or retained 
and noting whether the jobs were intended for low- and moderate-income people. The 
Department of Housing and Urban Development monitored projects funded through the 
Small Cities Development Program to assure they met the federal objectives.52 
The program records showed that indeed low and moderate income people were 
employed or had the opportunity to be hired. An on-site inspection by the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development concluded that the records accurately reflected 
businesses' hiring.53 However, no one was concerned with the quality of the jobs 
51 "Minnesota Small Cities Economic Development Program Application Manual," pages 5, 13, 17, 65, 
and 66. 
52 Department of Energy and Economic Development, "Minnesota Small Cities Development Program--
Program Manual," St. Paul, MN, 1987, pages 85 ff.; memorandum and attachments, Jack R. Stokvis, assistant 
secretary for Community Planning and Development C, to all regional administrators, all category A field 
office managers, all regional directors for CPD, and all CPD division directors, regarding response to OIG 
audit report on economic development in the state CDBG Program, January 26, 1989. 
53 Memorandum and attachments, Stokvis to all regional administrators ... , January 26, 1989. 
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promised or delivered, and the jobs were not necessarily good jobs as measured by wage 
levels, fringe benefits, and promotion possibilities. Indeed, as one DTED staff person 
wrote in a summary of a project, "The proposed wage scales for the first fifteen 
employees show a 100 percent benefit to low- and moderate-income persons."54 Low 
wage jobs met the federal objective of ''benefit" to low- and moderate-income people. 
The jobs that businesses promised to provide paid very little (see Table 7). 
Almost none of the positions, about 1 percent, were to pay the minimum wage. 
However, close to half of the jobs would have earnings at less than the level defined as 
poverty for a family of four. Almost two-thirds would pay less than the county average 
earnings per job for the year preceding the application for funds. 
The subsidized businesses delivered jobs that paid even less than they had 
promised. Only 6 percent paid the minimum wage, but nearly two-thirds of the jobs paid 
a salary less than the federally defined poverty level. More than 80 percent paid less 
than the county average earnings per job for the year preceding the application. Because 
the jobs could be delivered more than two years after an application's approval, average 
earnings per job rose between the time the jobs were promised and delivered in almost 
every county.55 If the salaries and wages paid had kept pace with the change in average 
earnings over time, delivered jobs would have paid more than promised, rather than less. 
54 Memorandum regarding City of Elbow Lake Small Cities Economic Development Grant Application, 
Bob Benner to Mark Dayton, February 17, 1984, in files of the Small Cities Economic Development 
Program. 
55 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, regional economic profile data, 
unpublished. The increase in earnings was in nominal dollars. 
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Table 7. Earnings Levels of Jobs Promised and Jobs Delivered in Subsidized Businesses3 
Level of Salary or 
Wage in Relation to 
Comparison Standard 
County average earnings per job 
for year preceding applicationb: 
At or above 
Below 
Poverty level for family of four, 1987c: 
Above 
At or below 
Minimum waged: 
Above 
Equal to 
If wage and hours data missing, 
- salary more than $6968c 
- salary less than or equal to $6968 
Total 
Number of 
Jobs Promised 
(percent) 
1747 (35.8) 
3133 (64.2) 
2730 (55.9) 
2150 (44.0) 
3873 (79.4) 
41 ( 0.8) 
946 {19.4) 
20 ( 0.4) 
4880 (100.0) 
Number of 
Jobs Delivered 
(percent) 
570 (17.3) 
2719 (82.7) 
1134 (34.5) 
2155 (65.5) 
2808 (85.4) 
205 ( 6.2) 
275 ( 8.4) 
1 ( 0.0) 
3289 (100.0) 
• Data on jobs promised and jobs delivered were collected from the program files in the Department of 
Trade and Economic Development, St. Paul, MN. 
b Source is Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, Regional Economic Profile Data 
for Minnesota, unpublished. 
c $11,611 per year. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Background 
Material and Data on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means, 101st 
Congress, 1st session, March 15, 1989, p. 941. 
d $3.35 per hour. 
c Annual earnings for 2080 hours of work at the minimum wage. 
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The discrepancy between promised and delivered jobs could have existed because 
lower wage jobs were filled earlier in the lives of projects than higher wage jobs. 
However, the same pattern existed in subsidized businesses when the projects were 
complete, where DTED staff had reviewed the project and decided it could be "closed" 
(see Table 8). Promised jobs were to pay low wages; delivered jobs paid even less with 
two-thirds of jobs paying below the poverty level for a family of four and more than 
80 percent of jobs paying less than the county average earnings per job. Three-fifths of 
the businesses whose projects had ended paid average earnings lower than they had 
promised in the application (see Table 9). Although the data on the projects reveal 
nothing about the situations of the people who held the jobs, many of those people must 
have remained low and moderate income after they took positions in the subsidized 
businesses. 
Jobs created or retained under the Small Cities Program paid little even though 
three-quarters of the businesses that received financing were in manufacturing, a sector 
that pays higher than the average for other sectors in the nation as a whole. The 
average weekly wage for a job in a manufacturing firm in Minnesota in 1986 was more 
than $500. Average weekly earnings for a job delivered in a subsidized manufacturing 
business amounted to slightly over $240.56 
Similar jobs might have existed without the program. Businesses that would have 
grown without the program might have paid the same low wages. Unquestionably, 
56 Minnesota Economic Resource Group, 1990 Economic Report to the Governor, Table 19; files of the 
Small Cities Economic Development Program. 
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Table 8. Earnings Levels of Jobs Promised and Jobs Delivered for Completed Projects 
in Subsidized Businesses8 
Level of Salary or 
Wage in Relation to 
Comparison Standard 
County average earnings per job 
for year preceding applicationb: 
At or above 
Below 
Poverty level for family of four, 1987: 
Above 
At or below 
Minimum wage: 
Above 
Equal to 
If wage and hours data missing, 
- salary more than $6968 
- salary less than or equal to $6968 
Total 
Number of 
Jobs Promised 
(percent) 
488 (33.8) 
956 (66.2) 
864 (59.8) 
580 (40.2) 
1204 (83.4) 
24 ( 1.7) 
215 (14.9) 
1 ( 0.1) 
1444 (100.0) 
Number of 
Jobs Delivered 
(percent) 
302 (19.0) 
1285 (81.0) 
543 (34.2) 
1044 (65.8) 
1336 (84.2) 
142 ( 8.9) 
109 ( 6.9) 
0 ( 0.0) 
1587 (100.0) 
• Data on jobs promised and jobs delivered were collected from the program files in the Department of 
Trade and Economic Development, St. Paul, MN. Included are projects that were closed and ready to be 
closed. 
b For other sources, see notes to Table 7. 
Table 9. Number of Businesses with Projects Completed by Relationship Between Average Delivered Earnings 
Per Job and Average Promised Earnings Per Job8 
Relationship Between Average Earnings 
of Delivered and Promised Jobs 
Delivered less than promised 
Delivered equal to promise 
Delivered greater than promised 
Total 
Number of Businesses 
(percent) 
25 ( 61.0) 
4 ( 9.8) 
12 ( 29.3) 
41 (100.0) 
• Data were collected from the program files in the Department of Trade and Economic Development, St. Paul, MN. 
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however, state and local governments were assisting businesses paying low wages, and the 
growth of such firms lowered average wages in the region. The agency decisions to fund 
these businesses rather than other businesses and the public decision to use tax receipts 
to fund these subsidies mean the progra~ may have shifted resources to businesses that 
pay wages lower than many others in the state. Does this matter? From one perspec-
tive, far from ''benefiting" people with low- and moderate-incomes, the state has 
facilitated the pauperization of rural people by subsidizing businesses that pay low wages. 
Government funds should subsidize good jobs, not ones that assure so many people live 
close to poverty. From another perspective, by taking the new jobs people have 
demonstrated that these low wage positions are preferable to their· other options. That 
is, if the program created new jobs in a community, it also improved the choices of 
people who work there. If people did not want the jobs, the businesses could not find 
employees at those wages and would have to pay more. Indeed, sometimes the busi-
nesses could not fill the low wage positions. One quarterly progress report described a 
"shortage" of skilled workers because people "can earn more at home on unemployment 
compensation and AFDC than at (the company)."57 The owner of a business in 
Blackduck, located in a county that had a high poverty rate and a low median income in 
1979, stated he could not fill jobs although he provided bus service for some workers and 
a day care center; new employees earned $4 per hour and could make $5 per hour after 
a year of working at the company.58 
57 Quarterly progress report for East Range Technologies, Aurora, MN, June 30, 1987, in files of the 
Small Cities Economic Development Program. 
58 Report on Anderson Fabrics, Minnesota Public Radio, St. Paul, MN, spring 1989. 
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Improving the Record of the Small Cities 
Economic Development Program 
The record of the Small Cities Economic Development Program in encouraging 
economic growth and bringing about redistribution to more distressed regions and poorer 
people shows that the program took the right approaches in some ways and not in 
others. Because of this mixed record, an evaluation controlling for other sources of 
growth in the state and its distressed areas would probably show, as evaluations have for 
other programs, few effects on Minnesota's growth or on the growth of distressed areas. 
An evaluation of improvements in the welfare of poor people would probably show none. 
The program administrators could improve the program's record of encouraging 
economic growth. To do so, they need to redirect the program to deal more effectively 
with market failure, instances wh(?n credit-worthy projects do not receive private 
financing although comparable projects do receive private support. Reorienting the 
program to better serve the needs of small businesses and the needs of women who own 
and manage businesses would increase the chances that the program causes growth. As 
a result, the program would have a greater likelihood of stimulating private investment, 
increasing the tax base, and creating new jobs. 
If program staff want the program to affect economic growth in the state, they 
need better assurances that when businesses claim that they need subsidies to stay in 
Minnesota or to locate in Minnesota, the claims are valid. When a business manager or 
owner states that the business may leave the state because of higher workers' 
compensation costs, for instance, program staff need to evaluate how other costs and 
access to markets will differ in alternative locations. Although a move will reduce 
.. 
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workers' compensation, it may raise other costs or cut connections with important 
customers, so the business is actually unlikely to move. Currently, the program is too 
likely to use public money to subsidize businesses for doing what they would have done 
anyway and, therefore, has no effect on economic growth. 
To assure that the program is encouraging growth in specific communities, the 
program staff need to do a more thorough assessment of businesses' financial needs. 
The DTED staff need to assume this responsibility, for local applicants have many 
reasons to put forward applications from businesses that have no credit problems or from 
risky projects that will never succeed. Although the Small Cities Economic Development 
Program staff have not taken on this responsibility in the past, the record of other, now 
defunct, state economic development programs and the efforts of some McKnight 
Initiative Fund offices have demonstrated that the analysis can be done well.59 
The DTED staff could also improve the program's performance in helping 
distressed areas and poor people. The application criteria for what constitutes "need" 
should be clearer, and communities with healthy economies should be excluded from the 
program. Further, DTED needs to seek more projects in the most distressed areas of 
the state. The supervisor of the Small Cities Economic Development Program explained 
that communities initiated applications for businesses; DTED staff did not take leader-
ship in identifying possible projects.60 
$ Friedman, "Improving Capital Market Efficiency Through State Programs;" Leckey, telephone 
communication, December 1990. 
60 Auger, personal communication, February 1988. 
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Currently, the program helps low- and moderate-income people principally by 
subsidizing businesses that offer low wage jobs. The jobs may offer an option that many 
low wage workers find better than their other choices, as workers demonstrate by filling 
the jobs. Alternatively, the program could choose to affect fewer people but assist more 
to escape poverty by assuring that the funds subsidize good jobs. Job quality includes 
many characteristics not considered here, but at a minimum the jobs would need to pay 
more than an amount that keeps a household in poverty. The jobs should also offer 
opportunity for workers to advance to better jobs. Most job training in subsidized 
businesses was closely tied to the work on the job. Instead, the program could do more 
to assure that workers receive more general training that would enable them to be more 
productive in a range of jobs. 
To change the way the program works and assure that the changes have desirable 
effects, the staff need to be able to monitor the program's activities. This means DTED 
needs a better management information system. For this study, the staff of the 
community development division provided lists of funded projects with an identification 
number, the jurisdiction, the business, the amount of funding, the status of the project, 
and the legislative district. DTED staff stated that, aside from this, no data existed in 
computer files. Staff cited examples of projects to illustrate points but appeared not to 
know overall characteristics of projects. Indeed, no one could know the details of so 
many projects without more data available for computerized analysis. 
In 1987 DTED hired the Urban Institute to design a management information 
system to monitor economic development projects. The proposed system would help 
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with project management, but it would not be useful for assessing whether the program 
is achieving its stated goals.61 
These approaches for helping the program achieve its goals are straightfmward, 
but the program staff would still face basic dilemmas in carrying out their charge. The 
program is to benefit low- and moderate-income people, but its tool is blunt and 
indirect--a subsidy to a business. This indirect effort to help poor people has led to 
subsidies to businesses that pay very low wages. The program is to encourage state and 
local economic growth, but the aims of local officials are sometimes inconsistent with 
efforts to benefit the state as a whole. Therefore, local officials may seek funds to 
encourage a business to locate in their town rather than in another or may apply to 
subsidize a business with no credit problems in order to be sure that the loan is repaid 
and a local revolving loan fund is created. The program is to deal with community and 
economic development needs, but the best ways to do so often do not involve subsidizing 
a business. What subsidies to businesses do best is help the businesses that receive the 
funds. The inconsistency between community needs and the goal of stimulating 
economic growth through business subsidies led to funding projects that did not 
encourage growth or had few community benefits. For instance, DTED financed a 
project that provided a car wash, a laundromat, and a convenience store partly in 
response to the community's need for a place where elderly people could walk to wash 
their clothes. For less than the $50,000 DTED provided, the city officials could have 
61 Blaine Liner, Urban Institute, to David Speer, commissioner, Department of Trade and Economic 
Development, and attachments, October 9, 1987; Blaine Liner, Urban Institute, Washington, D.C., telephone 
communication, winter 1989. 
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bought washing machines for their elderly residents, but the DTED program would not 
have allowed this direct solution to the community need. 
The changes suggested here may not be difficult, but the federal portion of the 
program had operated since 1983 and the state portion since 1984 without such changes 
occurring. During that time, debate over state economic development efforts and studies 
of economic development programs suggested some of these approaches.62 Whether 
such recommendations are reasonable depends on the reasons the program operated as 
it did over the period studied. A paper that will follow suggests several possible 
explanations for the results reported here and proposes other recommendations for 
helping the program achieve its explicit aims based on the understanding of why the 
program has operated as it has. 
62 Friedman, "Improving Capital Market Efficiency Through State Programs;" Program Evaluation 
Division, Economic Development (St. Paul: Office of the Legislative Auditor, March 1985). Furthermore, 
DTED employed staff in the Policy Analysis Office who understood the principles discussed in this paper 
and sought new ways to help programs achieve their goals (Abigail McKenzie, manager, Economic Analysis 
Section, and others in the Section, Department of Trade and Economic Development, St. Paul, MN, personal 
communication, 1985 through 1989). 
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Appendix Table A-1. Subsidized Businesses by Industrial Sector 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 
Mining 
Construction 
Manufacturing 
Transportation, communications, utilities 
Wholesale trade 
Retail trade 
Finance, insurance, real estate 
Services 
Unclassified or unknown 
Total 
Number of 
Assisted 
Businesses 
(percent) 
2 ( 0.9) 
0 ( 0.0) 
0 ( 0.0) 
167 ( 76.6) 
5 ( 2.3) 
12 ( 5.5) 
6 ( 2.8) 
0 ( 0.0) 
30 ( 13.8) 
1 ( 0.4) 
219 (100.ot. 
Number of 
Establishments 
in the state, 1986 
(percentl 
1000 ( 1.0) 
169 ( 0.2) 
8986 ( 8.6) 
6826 ( 6.5) 
4351 ( 4.2) 
9141 ( 8.7) 
26034 ( 24.9) 
8801 ( 8.4) 
31845 ( 30.4) 
7568 ( 7.2) 
104721 (100.0) 
• U.S. Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns. 1986: Minnesota (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 
Table lb. 
b Column docs not sum to 219 or to 1.00 percent because four businesses fell into two industrial categories. 
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